Short answer: There’s no consensus. Some philosophers think moral truths are objective; others think morality is a human construction; many hold hybrid views.

Key positions
- Moral realism (objective): There are stance‑independent facts about what we ought to do. Slavery would be wrong even if everyone approved. Motivations: the feel of moral reasons as binding, cross‑cultural convergence on core norms (no gratuitous harm, reciprocity), the idea of moral progress, and parity with other abstract domains (math, logic). Challenges: explaining what kind of facts these are and how we know them, plus evolutionary “debunking” arguments.
- Anti‑realism (invented):
  - Relativism/subjectivism: Moral truth is relative to cultures or persons. Strengths: fits disagreement and the social role of norms. Costs: trouble condemning atrocities across cultures; the reformer’s paradox (how can a society’s norms be wrong?).
  - Error theory: Our moral claims aim at objectivity but there are no such facts, so most moral claims are strictly false. Strength: tidy explanation of disagreement and evolution. Cost: very revisionary.
  - Non‑cognitivism/expressivism: Moral talk expresses attitudes/commitments rather than stating facts. Strength: matches how moral language motivates; sophisticated versions recover much of “objectivity.” Cost: explaining the authority of morality.
- Constructivism (hybrid): Moral truths are not “out there,” but they are what ideally rational agents would agree to under the right conditions (Rawls, Korsgaard, Scanlon). Aim: human‑made yet still authoritative. Challenge: which procedure/idealization is correct?
- Naturalistic realism (bridging view): Moral facts just are very complex natural facts about well‑being, harm, cooperation, flourishing. Strength: avoids spooky properties. Challenge: bridging “is” to “ought” without smuggling in values.

What science adds
- Evolution and culture shape our moral sentiments (cooperation, kinship, reputation), explaining both overlap and disagreement in norms. That by itself doesn’t decide whether morality is objective; it shows where our moral faculties come from, not whether they sometimes track independent truths.

A quick self‑test for your intuitions
- If you think “Even if everyone believed slavery was fine, it would still be wrong,” you lean realist.
- If you think “Wrong relative to our values; a different culture with different values is not mistaken,” you lean relativist.
- If you think “Moral claims purport to be true but there are no such truths,” you lean error theorist.
- If you think “The correct norms are the ones no one could reasonably reject under fair conditions,” you lean constructivist.

Practical upshot
- Regardless of metaethics, many everyday norms (avoid harm, keep promises, fairness) can be justified by reasons most views accept—well‑being, reciprocity, and mutual justification—so your day‑to‑day ethics may not hinge on settling the metaethical debate.

If you’d like, tell me which of the self‑test statements feels most natural to you, and I can suggest a view (and readings) that fits.
